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Positive Prognosis for Judges:
A Look into Judge-Directed
Negotiations in Medical Malpractice
Cases
Kristine Gamboa*
I. INTRODUCTION
A mother rushes her six-year-old daughter to North Central Bronx
Hospital.1 The little girl has a fever and a rash all over her body.2 At the
hospital, an emergency room nurse examines the little girl.3 The nurse
assures the mother that the little girl probably just has a virus and sends the
mother and daughter home.4 The following day, the little girl displays the
same symptoms.5 The mother rushes her to the hospital, but this time her
mother brings her to a private hospital.6 The doctors at the private hospital
examine the little girl and diagnose her with more than just a virus—a
bacterial blood infection.7 In order to save her life, the doctors have to
amputate her leg, the toes on the other leg’s foot, and the fingers on one of
her hands.8 Several months later, the little girl’s family notifies North
Central Bronx Hospital that it will be suing for medical malpractice for the

* Kristine Gamboa received her Juris Doctor from Pepperdine University Law School and
Certificate in Dispute Resolution from the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution in 2013. She
would like to thank the Honorable Douglas McKeon, the staff at Pepperdine Dispute Resolution
Law Journal, and her family for their help and support.
1. Gale Scott, Med Mal Cases Get Expert Hearings, CRAIN’S NEW YORK BUSINESS, Aug. 22,
2010, http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20100822/SUB/308229981.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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hospital’s misdiagnosis.9 Even though the misdiagnosis was clearly North
Central Bronx Hospital’s fault10 and the family most likely would get a
verdict in its favor, the family would be in for a long journey of medical
malpractice litigation.11
Medical malpractice litigation has been characterized as burdensome,
expensive, and slow.12 A patient must be willing to be interrogated by
attorneys, submit to a deposition, go to trial if the case does not settle, pay
attorney’s fees, and wait years for compensation.13 However, the primary
issue concerning medical malpractice litigation has been its exorbitant cost.14
Reports show that health care providers incur costs amounting to tens of
billions of dollars each year due to medical malpractice liability.15
Because of these overwhelming statistics, studies have been conducted
in an effort to reduce medical malpractice liability.16 These studies looked at
the needs of injured patients and the reasons why they file medical
malpractice claims against their health care providers.17 In the 1990s, all
levels of the health care system made concerted efforts to address patient
and health care provider concerns.18 Moreover, the health care system
looked into alternative forms of dispute resolution as a way to reduce

9. Id.
10. Id. (quoting the then-Bronx Superior Court Judge Douglas McKeon who became involved
in the mishap when the family notified the city several months later that it was suing for medical
malpractice: “The misdiagnosis was clearly the city-run hospital’s fault.”).
11. Id.
12. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1114 (2006).
13. Id. at 1114–15. Other problems a plaintiff may face include being “blacklisted” by other
physicians or providers who refuse to treat patients who are known to sue and have terminated their
existing relationships with a health care provider in order to bring suit. Id. at 1114; see, e.g.,
Christine Wiebe, Physicians Take the Offensive Against Malpractice Suits, MEDSCAPE MONEY &
MED., Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/474639 (reporting that
doctors in Texas are blacklisting malpractice claimants and that doctors are requiring patients to
pledge that they will not assert claims).
14. Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care Reform and Medical Malpractice Claims, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 871, 871 (2010) (citing Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Administrative
Compensation for Medical Malpractice Injuries: Reconciling the Brave New World of Patient Safety
and the Torts System, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 73, 74 (2004)).
15. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, The Health Care Reform Act of 2010
and Medical Malpractice Liability: Worlds in Collision or Ships Passing in the Night?, 64 SMU L.
REV. 735, 739 (2011).
16. Id. at 740 (citing Rothstein, supra note 14, at 872).
17. Id. at 740 (citing Rothstein, supra note 14, at 872).
18. Id. at 740 (citing Paul J. Barringer et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical
Injuries: A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 725, 740–42 (2008)).
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medical malpractice claims.19 Nonetheless, in the early 2000s, the cost of
physicians’ malpractice insurance premiums still increased significantly.20
This increase started a debate regarding who was at fault for the
significant costs of medical malpractice liability.21 One side blamed the
costs on the “litigiousness of patients” and the amount of jury awards.22
Because of these arguments, some providers advocated for tort reform to
limit medical malpractice lawsuits.23 This reform was seen as a way to
ultimately reduce malpractice premiums for health care providers.24
However, it would require changing existing laws.25 The other side blamed
health care providers for utilizing “defensive medicine” out of fear of
potential liability.26 This side argued that “defensive medicine” ultimately
led to increased costs.27

19. Id. at 740 (citing Barringer et al., supra note 18, at 740–42).
20. Id. at 740 (citing J. Robert Hunter, Gillian Cassell-Stiga & Joanne Doroshow, True Risk:
Medical Liability, Malpractice Insurance and Health Care 14 (2009), available at http://www.
centerjd.org/air/TrueRiskF.pdf (graph)).
21. Id. at 740–41.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 741.
24. Id.
25. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT,
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability/medliabrep.htm (last updated Feb. 2012) [hereinafter
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT]. Some states
have initiated malpractice reform to cap non-economic damages. See MICHELLE M. MELLO &
ALLEN KACHALIA, EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM
(2010),
available
at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Apr10_MedicalMalpractice_
CONTRACTOR.pdf. For example, in 1975, California became the first state to cap non-economic
damages to $250,000. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (codified at
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2006)).
26. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15. “Defensive medicine” occurs “when doctors order
tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid certain high-risk patients or procedures, primarily because of
concern about malpractice liability.” U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-H--602, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (1994), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.
edu/policy/9405.pdf.
27. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 741. The debate also surrounded the insurance
industry. Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 393, 394–95 (2005). Trial lawyers and others argued that the high-priced phase of the liability
insurance underwriting cycle fueled the medical malpractice insurance crisis in the early 2000s. Id.
In contrast, medical associations argued that the crisis represented the long overdue consequences of
escalating tort costs that were allowed by the competitive phase of the insurance underwriting cycle.
Id.
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Because of the debate, and perhaps because both sides of the debate
have merits, President Obama addressed medical malpractice reform in his
September 2009 address to Congress.28 In his address, President Obama
directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, to
allocate grants for various projects aimed at reforming medical malpractice
liability.29
One grant was made to the New York State Unified Court System to
fund the implementation of a judge-directed negotiation program for early
settlement in five academic medical centers in New York City and to expand
the existing judge-directed negotiation program.30
A judge-directed
negotiation is a process in which judges who have medical knowledge
conduct and direct negotiations in a medical malpractice lawsuit rather than
have the lawsuit go to trial.31 It focuses on early court intervention and
facilitates discussion among attorneys about claims and potential
settlements.32 Early court intervention takes the form of negotiations, which
are like settlement conferences, but instead of being held years after a case is
filed, they occur early on in the lawsuit, only months after a case is filed.33
The case of the little girl who was misdiagnosed at North Central Bronx
Hospital34 was part of the judge-directed negotiation experimental system in
the Bronx.35 After five intense sessions with a judge, both sides agreed to
settle the case for $6.8 million.36 Although this amount is significantly less

28. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Overhauling Health Care: Address to a Joint
Session of Congress (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http:// www.presidentialrhetoric.com/
speeches/09.09.09.html [hereinafter the President’s Address to a Joint Sessions of Congress].
29. Id. (recognizing the need to address medical malpractice liability reform: “I don’t believe
malpractice reform is a silver bullet, but I’ve talked to enough doctors to know that defensive
medicine may be contributing to unnecessary costs. . . . So I’m proposing that we move forward on
a range of ideas about how to put patient safety first and let doctors focus on practicing medicine. . . .
I’m directing my Secretary of Health and Human Services to move forward on . . . [a demonstration
projects] initiative today.”).
30. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 741 (citing AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH
AND QUALITY, GRANT SUMMARY FOR GRANT NUMBER HS19505-01, http://gold.ahrq.gov/
projectsearch/grant_summary.jsp?grant=R18+HS19505-01 (last visited Nov. 7, 2013)).
31. Just What the Doctor Ordered? Bringing Judges into Medical-Malpractice Negotiations,
NEGOTIATION (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/images/
posts/NEG0911_5.pdf [hereinafter Just What the Doctor Ordered?].
32. Alice Gallegos, Medical Liability: Cutting Costs From the Bench, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct.
31, 2011, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/10/31/prsa1031.htm.
33. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, 29
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 108, 108 (2011).
34. See Scott, supra note 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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than the little girl might have received from a jury trial, her lawyer was able
to devise a settlement that guaranteed lifelong payments and included money
for college.37 According to the little girl’s lawyer, this structured settlement
could not have happened with a jury verdict.38 The little girl’s family and
the hospital staff both left the judge-directed negotiation content with the
settlement.39
This article will look at judge-directed negotiations, and more
specifically, whether this program can help improve medical malpractice
litigation. Part II will look at the existing judge-directed negotiation
program in New York. Part III will explore the program’s success. Part IV
will discuss praises for the program, whereas Part V will discuss the
criticisms. Finally, Part VI will conclude that judge-directed negotiations
can improve medical malpractice litigation, and that other states should
consider adopting a similar program.
II. THE NEW YORK JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATION PROGRAM
In 2002, the Honorable Douglas McKeon of the Bronx County Supreme
Court developed the concept of judge-directed negotiations.40 Justice
McKeon, who has been presiding for many years over thousands of civil
claims in one of the busiest courts in the country,41 was trying to find a way
to deal with a backlog of medical malpractice cases coming from the city’s
Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”). 42 One thing that bothered
Justice McKeon about these cases was how they were treated in the system:
they were classified as every other lawsuit, despite their complexity and the
increased amount of time it took to review them.43 Therefore, Justice

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Gallegos, supra note 32. Justice McKeon is also Chief Judge of Appellate Term, First
Department. New York Department of Health, New York State to Conduct Medical Liability
Reform Demonstration with $3 Million Federal Grant, available at http://www.health.ny.gov/press/
releases/2010/2010-06-16_medical_liability_reform_demo_3_mill_fed_grant.htm (last updated June
2010) [hereinafter New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration]. Justice
McKeon presides over all medical malpractice cases involving Health and Hospitals Corporation
hospitals in the Bronx and Manhattan. Id.
41. Gallegos, supra note 32.
42. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
43. Gallegos, supra note 32.
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McKeon decided to begin meeting with the attorneys representing the parties
in medical malpractice cases.44 The meetings would take place in his
chambers,45 where they would discuss the claims’ strengths and
weaknesses.46
Justice McKeon relied on his years of experience presiding over medical
malpractice trials to guide him during these meetings.47 Additionally, he has
acquired medical knowledge from auditing early morning anatomy classes at
the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and he has kept up to date on new
medical techniques and technology by reading medical journals.48
Furthermore, a nurse who has legal training assists Justice McKeon.49
With all of these resources, Justice McKeon can advise each party on what
they could reasonably expect from a jury trial and attempt to guide the
parties toward an agreement.50
Justice McKeon’s model expanded into a similar program in which a
judge with expertise in medical matters becomes the “point person” once a
plaintiff files a medical malpractice lawsuit.51 The judge directs the entire
process by convening the parties to discuss the case and by helping broker a
settlement.52 The judge conducts the negotiations, but does not impose a
settlement amount.53 If the parties do not agree on a settlement, the plaintiff
may move ahead with the lawsuit.54 In addition to using judge-directed
negotiations based on Justice McKeon’s model, this program is aimed at
improving patient safety and reducing malpractice costs.55

44. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
45. Id.
46. Gallegos, supra note 32.
47. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
48. Scott, supra note 1.
49. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. Federal funding for the program funds the
registered nurse with legal training. Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot
Program, supra note 33, at 108.
50. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
51. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT, supra
note 25.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. More specifically, the program consists of
four components: (1) each hospital will develop and promote a culture of patient safety; (2) four
hospitals will initiate safety interventions in obstetrics and one hospital will initiate safety
interventions in general surgery; (3) each hospital will implement a program whereby it will provide
early disclosure to a patient and, if necessary, a patient’s family when a medical error occurs and, if
appropriate, make an early (pre-litigation) offer of compensation; (4) a courtroom will be established
to achieve early settlement through judge-directed negotiations for medical malpractice cases that do
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This program is one of seven grants that were distributed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.56 The New York judge-directed
negotiation program started in Fall 2010 and was funded for three years with
$3 million from the federal government.57 The grant money has allowed
New York to expand its program beyond the Bronx courts, over which
Justice McKeon presided, to courts in Brooklyn and Manhattan.58
Additionally, the New York program now handles cases against both city
and private hospitals.59
This program is aimed at cutting $1.4 billion that is spent annually on
medical malpractice premiums in New York.60 In addition to these
exorbitant expenses, New York health care providers’ malpractice insurance
rates are among the highest in the country.61 Furthermore, obstetrical and
surgical premiums in New York have increased.62 Even with these startling
statistics, the New York judge-directed negotiation program looks promising

not settle early and lead to lawsuits. New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform
Demonstration, supra note 39.
56. Michelle Andrews, Judge Devises Model for Resolving Medical Malpractice Cases More
Quickly, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/judge-devises-model-for-resolving-medical-malpractice-cases-morequickly/2011/11/16/gIQAT0EthN_story.html; Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 741 (citing
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 25).
Under the direction of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services’s Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality administered grants to Texas,
Illinois, Michigan, and New York. Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot
Program, supra note 33, at 108. Under another separate grant, five judges in Buffalo, New York,
started a similar program in November 2011. Gallegos, supra note 31.
57. Suzanne Sataline, Mediating Malpractice, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383501123709186.html.
Harvard
University’s School of Public Health has received a substantial part of the grant for evaluating and
reporting the results after the three-year trial period. Health Care Appropriation Provides a CourtBased ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at 108.
58. William Glaberson, To Curb Malpractice Costs, Judges Jump in Early, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/nyregion/to-curb-malpractice-costsjudges-jump-in-early.html?pagewanted=all.
59. Id.
60. Sataline, supra note 57.
61. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
62. See Sataline, supra note 57. For example, in Brooklyn’s Maimonides Medical Center,
obstetrical premiums increased from $13.5 million in 2007 to $17 million in 2008. Id. Pam Brief,
the CEO and president of Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn, said that her staff has been
searching for a long time for a way to cut insurance premiums, especially those for childbirth. Id.
One technique they have tried is to require that any member who has contact with an OB patient
knows how to read a fetal monitor. Id.
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in improving New York’s malpractice liability because of its 95% settlement
rate.63 With this success rate, HHC’s malpractice costs decreased from $196
million in 2003 to $130 million in 2010,64 and the hospital’s average
payment in medical malpractice cases declined from $567,000 in 2003 to
$428,000 in 2010 as a result of measures to reduce liability costs, including
settling cases before they reach trial.65 The Federal Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality, which funds the New York judge-directed negotiation
program, estimates that the program could save more than $1 billion
annually throughout the nation.66
III. THE SUCCESS OF JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATIONS
The decreased malpractice costs and the increased settlement rates
resulting from the judge-directed negotiation program give rise to the
question of why is the program so successful. To adequately answer this
question, we will look at the program’s two components: judges and
negotiations.
A. Putting the “Judge” in Judge-Directed Negotiations
Judges are essential to the success of the New York judge-directed
negotiation program.67 In comparison to programs in other states that were
given grants,68 New York is the only state with a court component.69 Under
the New York program, medical malpractice cases against any of the five
participating hospitals are automatically given to judges in the judgedirected negotiation program.70 These judges attempt to bring the parties
together to discuss and address the situation.71 Then, the judges can advise
the parties accordingly such that they come to a settlement.72

63. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. According to New York State Court
officials, statistics indicate Justice McKeon settles about 20% more cases than other judges.
Glaberson, supra note 58.
64. Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at
108 (quoting Sataline, supra note 56: “The [judge-directed negotiations] effort has cut payouts to
$130 million this year, from a high of $196 million in 2003.”).
65. Glaberson, supra note 58.
66. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
67. See Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note
33, at 108.
68. These states include Texas, Illinois, and Michigan. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 747 (citing Scott, supra note 1).
72. See id.
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Medical malpractice litigation can go on for many years with minimal
judge involvement, and this lack of involvement increases legal expenses
and solidifies the parties’ positions.73 These factors make it difficult for a
judge in a non-judge-directed negotiation to control medical malpractice
lawsuits.74 Without this control, lawsuits can come back several times to be
heard before different judges.75 Settlement also becomes more difficult the
longer a case lingers.76 However, in a judge-directed negotiation, a judge
intervenes early on in the case and this can increase the chance of
settlement.77
Coming to a settlement agreement, of course, depends in part on the
judge who conducts the negotiations.78 Justice McKeon acknowledges that
certain judges would not be right for the role because of their lack of
communication skills.79 Accordingly, judges in the program should be
knowledgeable in medicine80 and communication81 because of the number of
complexities in the health care field.
The most obvious complexity is the amount of medical knowledge
necessary to understand the health care field.82 Additionally, as part of the
grant, each court will have the aid of a registered nurse with legal training
who can confer with judges on claims and provide any necessary medical

73. Glaberson, supra note 58.
74. Id.
75. Michael Virtanen, More NY Courts to Focus on Medical Malpractice, WALL ST. J., Nov.
11, 2011, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/11/more-ny-courts-focusmedical-malpractice/?page=all (quoting Justice McKeon: “Without close scrutiny by one judge,
cases can come back several times before various judges with settlements discussed but doctors
refusing to agree.”).
76. Glaberson, supra note 58.
77. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
78. Gallegos, supra note 32 (quoting Ronald Landau, a New York plaintiffs’ lawyer who had
four medical liability cases go through the program: “If you can find a judge who can understand the
perspective of the plaintiff and understand the constraints and the perspective of the defendant, it’s a
terrific plan . . . . I have had multiple mediation experiences over the years, and I would say 85%
don’t work because the mediator just doesn’t have the right temperament.”).
79. See Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, Bronx County Supreme Court
(Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon].
80. See Scott, supra note 1 (noting that “having medically sophisticated justices is crucial.”).
81. Id. For example, a “Medicine for Judges” course was designed to teach 100 justices about
medicine and “humanness,” Justice McKeon’s term for “becoming a compassionate, sympathetic
listener.” Id.
82. See id. (quoting Justice McKeon who “always felt [he] needed basic knowledge of the
medical lingo to effectively preside over a trial.”).
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background.83 Moreover, Justice McKeon is using part of the grant to
design medical curriculum for judges so that they can gain knowledge in
medicine.84
Another complexity is the number of different parties involved in the
health care field’s decision-making system.85 For example, the party who
purchases the service might not necessarily be the party who receives the
service.86 Other complexities include the emotion and passion in the health
care field due to the fact that people’s lives are at stake.87 Because of these
complexities, judges under the judge-directed negotiation program need to
have special training in medical-related lawsuits so that they are better able
to evaluate the merits of a medical malpractice case.88
B. Negotiating in Judge-Directed Negotiations
Like judges, negotiations are another important aspect of the judgedirected negotiation program.89 Negotiations can be defined as a process in
which parties exchange information, generate decisions, and then implement
what was decided.90 Justice McKeon has found that parties are willing to
come in and talk if there is the potential to settle a case sooner rather than
later for a significant amount of money.91 These negotiations are more than
just the typical discussions of how much the parties want and are willing to
spend; rather, the parties also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their

83.
84.
85.

Gallegos, supra note 32.
Scott, supra note 1.
Leonard J. Marcus, A Culture of Conflict: Lesson from Renegotiating Health Care, 5 J.
HEALTH CARE LAW & POL’Y 447, 457 (2002).
86. Id. Similarly, a physician who orders a health care service does not necessarily pay the
financial consequences of that order. Id.
87. Id.
88. Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 15, at 747. See Gallegos, supra note 31 (discussing a
plaintiffs’ lawyer who believed that through a judge-directed negotiation, he would be able to get at
the complexities of the case with a judge who understood medical issues).
89. See Andrews, supra note 56.
90. Marcus, supra note 85, at 458. In an interest-based negotiation, parties address their
mutual and different interests. Id. at 464. Interests include goals, objectives, ideas, concerns, and
hopes that the parties want to be satisfied through the negotiation. Id. In positional negotiations, one
party’s objectives are best satisfied through victory, control, or dominance. Id. Therefore, positional
negotiations usually establish winners and losers. Id. However, it is natural to negotiate based on
self-interests because these interests define what the parties want to accomplish. Id. (citing Leonard
J. Marcus & Barry C. Dorn, Negotiating Organizational Alliances: The Walk in the Woods, AM.
MED. NEWS, Sept. 21, 1998, at 19, available at http://business.highbeam.com/137033/article-1G121168914/negotiating-organizational-alliances-walk-woods).
91. Andrews, supra note 56.
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respective claims.92 The discussions lead to more discussions, with each
case having about three to four negotiation meetings.93 The negotiation may
reach a point where the attorneys leave the meeting but continue their
discussions over the phone.94 It is thus this “[negotiation] environment that
fosters discussion, and discussion fosters resolution.”95
The negotiation and judge component of the judge-directed negotiation
program help contribute to the success of the program.
IV. PRAISES FOR THE JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATION PROGRAM
Due to the success of judge-directed negotiations, there are many praises
for the program. The praises regard the amount of time and money saved to
settle a case, and the forum the program provides for both parties to be
heard.
A. Giving the Gift of Efficiency
One of the benefits of the judge-directed negotiation program is that it
saves time and money because it bypasses years of court battles.96 Judgedirected negotiations have cut the HHC’s case backlog by 33%, and the
average time it takes to resolve a case has fallen by 17% in the past three
years.97 This success may be seen as a result of the judge’s involvement in a
judge-directed negotiation.98 From the very beginning of a judge-directed
negotiation, the judge “can delve into a case with an eye towards
settlement.”99 The judge then holds frequent negotiation meetings in the
beginning stages of a case, which can lead to an early settlement.100
This timeline is very different from what typically happens now, given
that the pre-trial phase—in which depositions are taken and other evidence is

92. Gallegos, supra note 32.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Telephone Interview with Justice Douglas McKeon, supra note 79.
96. Glaberson, supra note 58.
97. Scott, supra note 1.
98. See Andrews, supra note 56.
99. Id. (quoting Justice McKeon: “From the beginning, that designated jurist can delve into the
case with an eye toward settlement.”).
100. See Glaberson, supra note 58.
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gathered—can drag on for months or even years.101 During this pre-trial
phase, a number of judges may be involved, and no one judge may push the
parties toward resolution.102 Usually settlement conferences are held years
after a case is filed, and it might be seen as merely a “pro forma exercise”103
that is held simply as a formality because it might be too late in the lawsuit
for the parties to settle complicated issues.104
However, negotiation meetings in a judge-directed negotiation occur
after only several months.105 These settlement conferences can better help
parties settle their case,106 which is particularly important because medical
malpractice cases take longer than other kinds of tort cases.107 If the parties
do settle, compensation to injured parties can be paid out years earlier than a
jury award and without lengthy appeals.108
Judge-directed negotiations are also helpful in finding and excluding
doctors who have no responsibility early on in a case.109 Plaintiff attorneys
initially often include a long list of alleged defendants in the claim such that
they do not lose the chance of adding defendants later.110 This strategy can
cause doctors who are not at fault to spend years defending a claim before

101. Andrews, supra note 56. According to Michelle M. Mello, a Harvard professor of law and
public health who is evaluating the New York experiment, a typical medical malpractice case can
take three years from the date the claim is filed to the date the case is closed. Id. A typical time
frame for settling one of Justice McKeon’s cases is six to nine months. Id.
102. Id. In a traditional medical malpractice claim, up to four different judges may oversee one
medical liability case at different intervals. Gallegos, supra note 31.
103. Glaberson, supra note 58.
104. Id. (quoting Michelle M. Mello: “Ordinarily when the parties come to a settlement
conference, it’s late in the game . . . . It’s often a pro forma exercise rather than an attempt to
grapple with the tricky issues in the case.”). Under New York’s Civil Practice Law Rule 3409, a
court involved in a medical malpractice action shall hold a mandatory settlement conference 45 days
after the filing of the note of issue and certificate of readiness or within 45 days after the denial of
such motion. NY CPLR Rule 3409.
105. Health Care Appropriation Provides a Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at
108. There is a strong policy in favor of allowing a judge’s inherent authority to preserve efficiency
and the judicial process through settlement conferences. See 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1525.1
(3d ed.).
106. Glaberson, supra note 58.
107. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1106 (2006). Michael Heise, a professor who
studied a nationwide sample of tried cases, found that the average length for civil cases that reached
juries was 30.2 months whereas the average length of tried malpractice cases lasted 38.4 months or
more than half a year longer. Id. (citing Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of
Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834 (2000)).
108. Glaberson, supra note 58.
109. Gallegos, supra note 32.
110. Id.
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being dismissed from the case.111 Doctors initially named in a traditional
medical malpractice claim generally are not dismissed from the lawsuit until
after the discovery process, which can be up to fifteen months after a claim
has been filed.112 However, in judge-directed negotiations, doctors who are
not at fault typically are dismissed within the first six months.113
Not only can doctors be dismissed from the claim, but also the entire
claim can be dismissed.114 During the judge’s meeting with the parties in a
judge-directed negotiation, the judge can advise each party as to what it can
reasonably expect from a jury trial.115 In one case, Justice McKeon warned
lawyers representing a hospital that jurors most likely would not be
influenced by their claim that a patient who died was somewhat responsible
for his death because he ignored his doctors.116 A judge’s intervention will
help a party evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of its case, which might
help a party to recognize its “unrealistic expectations about winning big in
court”117 or deter a party from pursuing a weak case.118
Thus, quick resolution of medical malpractice cases benefits all parties:
the court system gets to put its limited resources elsewhere, health care
providers can put the situation behind them, and hospitals can gain
information to help improve patient safety efforts.119
B. Giving Parties a Voice
Another praise for judge-directed negotiations is that both parties to be
heard during the negotiation meetings.120 Being given a voice may be as
important to a party as its financial concerns.121 Communicating with the
other party also allows parties to learn more about the situation and better
understand it.122 A Harvard School of Public Health’s Care Negotiation

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Glaberson, supra note 58.
117. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
118. Glaberson, supra note 58.
119. Andrews, supra note 56.
120. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
121. Id.
122. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
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training seminar demonstrated that once there is an error, problem, or
miscommunication while a patient is under the care of the hospital, patients
and family members primarily seek to know what happened.123 However,
our standard adversarial system has been seen as discouraging such
discussion.124 Judge-directed negotiations provide parties with a forum to
discuss and gain a better understanding of the situation.125 Moreover,
lawyers representing either party also feel that their voices are heard in an
appropriate forum given that judges in the judge-directed negotiation
program have medical knowledge, and thus, understand the situation better
than the average judge.126 In this way, judge-directed negotiations can be
seen as providing a more holistic way of approaching medical malpractice
cases.127
V. CRITICISMS OF JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATIONS
Although there are many praises for judge-directed negotiations, there
are still criticisms. These criticisms question a judge’s involvement in the
negotiations, the fairness of the settlements, and whether the program
actually solves medical malpractice problems.
A. Too Much Judge in Judge-Directed Negotiations?
A major criticism against judge-directed negotiations is the judge’s
involvement in the negotiation.128 As previously stated, judges in judgedirected negotiations intervene early in a case and guide the parties toward a
settlement.129 During these negotiations, a judge’s neutrality might be
123. Marcus, supra note 85, at 454.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 454. There are alternatives to the legal system: patients may change providers,
complain to their providers, or report their providers’ inadequacies to regulators and disciplinary
authorities. Hyman & Silver, supra note 12, at 1115 (citing Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel,
Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 105,
108 (1990)). These alternatives are cheaper than a lawsuit and may be more efficient. Id. However,
some of those people who sue also take advantage of these alternatives as well. See May & Stengel,
supra note 76, at 108 (finding that 85% of those who sued switched doctors and 31% complained).
126. Scott, supra note 1 (quoting Barry Washor, a Manhattan medical malpractice lawyer:
“Under the current system, you can end up with any Supreme Court Justice . . . . Some of them
don’t have a clue. They don’t understand the case, and they don’t understand the law.”).
127. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at
108.
128. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31 (noting that the “process also invites
criticism by borrowing some elements of mediation and neglecting others.”).
129. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT, supra
note 25.
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questioned because a judge might unknowingly bring some degree of bias
toward a party or lawsuit, particularly if that judge is involved in both the
negotiation meetings and subsequent adjudication.130 In addition, a judge’s
neutrality might be questioned in a judge-directed negotiation because a
judge is allowed to express his or her opinion about a party’s offer. 131
Neutrality is an important element of any mediator,132 who is typically not
allowed to express his or her opinion about a party’s offer, 133 and some
argue that it is compromised in judge-directed negotiations.134 However,
this argument assumes that judge-directed negotiations are considered
mediations, which is not how participants in judge-directed negotiations
categorize them.135
Rather, participants distinguish judge-directed
negotiations as a mediation technique.136
Regardless of whether or not judge-directed negotiations are a mediation
technique or type of mediation, some observers are still wary of a judge’s
involvement in that they characterize it as intimidation.137 An injured party,
who views the judge as an authoritative figure, might be intimidated by the
judge’s involvement.138 Because of this intimidation, the injured party might
accept an offer that is not fair.139 However, injured parties might actually

130. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
131. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31. For example, Justice McKeon warned
hospital lawyers that jurors most likely would not be influenced by their claim that a patient who
died was somewhat responsible for his death because he ignored his doctors. Glaberson, supra note
58.
132. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115 (West 2006) (defining “mediator” as “a neutral person
who conducts a mediation.) “Mediator” includes any person designated by a mediator either to
assist in the mediation or to communicate with the participants in preparation for a mediation, a
neutral person who conducts a mediation. Id.
133. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
134. Id.
135. See Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note
33, at 108.
136. Id. (quoting Judge Judy Harris Kluger, chief of policy and planning for New York State’s
Unified Court System: “It’s not ADR-type mediation . . . it’s really a judge sitting down and trying
to settle a case early on, earlier than they would other cases. It’s a mediation technique.”); see also
Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, supra note 79.
137. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Glaberson, supra note 58 (quoting Louis G. Solimano, a plaintiffs’ lawyer
who seemed disappointed that “[he] didn’t get a grand slam” and Nicholas I. Timko, the president of
the New York State Trial Lawyers Association, who believes “[t]here’s pressure to take less than
might be fair compensation.”); Virtanen, supra note 75 (quoting Arthur Levin, director of the Center
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benefit from a judge’s involvement, particularly if the judge has many years
of malpractice experience and can advise the parties accordingly.140
B. Fair Settlements in Judge-Directed Negotiations?
In addition to a judge’s involvement in a judge-directed negotiation,
another criticism is that the process is unfair to the injured parties.141
Because judge-directed negotiations occur in a judge’s chambers, some fear
that injured parties will be “shut out” of the courtroom and their day in
court.142 Although generally the lawyers are the only people present during
the negotiations,143 judges might allow the injured parties to attend.144
Nonetheless, others are still afraid that judge-directed negotiations might
allow lawyers to negotiate in private over the price of a party’s injury.145
However, regardless of whether or not a case is part of the judge-directed
negotiation program, lawyers still negotiate in private and must participate in
mandatory settlement conferences.146
Others feel that judge-directed negotiations are unfair to the injured
parties because injured parties frequently receive less than they would from
a jury award.147 However, Justice McKeon argues that injured parties
probably want fair compensation received in a timelier manner rather than a
jury award that takes several years.148 Even if an injured party receives
compensation, others argue that the injured parties are still vulnerable to
exploitation because they receive offers early on in a case, while still
working through the trauma of the injury or loss of a loved one and before

for Medical Consumer: “Even though people are not forced into [negotiated settlements], I have no
idea how coercive or not the pitch is.”).
140. See Glaberson, supra note 58 (quoting Ronald J. Landau, a plaintiffs’ lawyer, who stated
that “[w]hen [Justice McKeon] gives an opinion to me about how he thinks a jury’s going to respond
to a case, he’s generally on target.”).
141. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
142. Id. In contrast, some lawyers actually like not having the injured parties in the courtroom
because they are more relaxed without patients and doctors watching. See Glaberson, supra note 58.
143. See Glaberson, supra note 58. Lawyers have the authority to settle, and thus, injured
parties are not required to attend the judge-directed negotiation. Id.
144. See Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, supra note 79.
145. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
146. See Glaberson, supra note 58; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing
mandatory settlement conferences).
147. Gallegos, supra note 32.
148. Gallegos, supra note 32; see also Andrews, supra note 58 (quoting Leslie Kelmatcher,
president of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association: “Many families would rather have 5
percent less now than a [larger amount] three years down the road. Prompt resolution allows them to
get financial compensation and some degree of closure, so they can move on with their lives.”).
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they know the extent of their future expenses.149 Some proposals may even
be extremely punitive toward patients who do not accept the settlement offer
provided by the hospital.150 However, a judge’s role in a judge-directed
negotiation is to guide the parties toward a fair settlement, and thus, the
judge can prevent a party from using such bullying tactics.151
C. Problem Solved with Judge-Directed Negotiations?
Another criticism is that judge-directed negotiations only address the
surface of the medical malpractice system, rather than delving into the root
of the problem by improving hospitals and patient safety.152 In fact, the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice’s recently studied California malpractice
claims and concluded that improved safety performance is an important
“focal point” in addressing the medical malpractice debate.153 However, the
expanded judge-directed negotiation program does focus on improving
patient safety and reducing malpractice costs.154 This focus differs from
traditional tort reforms, which “were adopted to ensure access to liability
insurance for providers and to protect them from the volatility of the medical
liability insurance market.”155
In order to enhance patient safety, an effective system should require
providers to “candidly acknowledge their errors and learn from their
mistakes.”156 The judge-directed negotiation program does include this

Amy Widman, Liability and the Health Care Bill: An “Alternative” Perspective, 1 CAL. L.
64 (2010).
150. Id. For example, some proposals penalize patients who reject an offer with fees or require
a higher burden of proof to patients who sue. Id. (citing Bernard Black, David A. Hyman & Charles
Silver, The Effects of “Early Offers” in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 6 J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 723, 727 (2009)).
151. See Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
152. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at
108.
153. Widman, supra note 149, at 60 (citing MICHAEL D. GREENBERG ET AL., IS BETTER
PATIENT SAFETY ASSOCIATED WITH LESS MALPRACTICE ACTIVITY? EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA
(2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR824.pdf).
154. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
155. Leonard J. Nelson, III, David J. Becker & Michael A. Morrisey, Medical Liability and
Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 496 (2011).
156. Id. (citing JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., HEALTHCARE AT
THE CROSSROADS: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM AND PATIENT
SAFETY (2005), available at http:// www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/Medical_Liability.pdf
149.

REV. CIRCUIT 57,
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requirement because it is part of a bigger project that consists of four major
components, three of which are specifically aimed at improving patient
safety.157 One of these components, the hospital component, entails that
each hospital implement a program that will provide early disclosure to a
patient and, if the patient desires, to his or her family when a medical error
occurs.158 Furthermore, as part of the New York program’s full-disclosure
policy, hospitals have agreed to own up to their mistakes and apologize.159
This early disclosure program will allow providers to candidly acknowledge
their errors and learn from their mistakes, which will help enhance patient
safety.160
Although the judge-directed negotiation component does not
specifically state that it will improve patient safety, it does state that the
[hereinafter HEALTHCARE AT THE CROSSROADS]; Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Approach to
Reducing Error, 283 JAMA 1742, 1742 (2000)).
157. See New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, supra note 40.
158. Id.
159. Scott, supra note 1. This full-disclosure policy is known as “Sorry Works”. Id.; see DOUG
WOJCIESZAK, ET AL., SORRY WORKS! DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (Authorhouse 2007); SORRY WORKS!, http://www.sorryworks.net/
(last updated Dec. 12, 2012).
Apologies and disclosure in the medical context are beyond the scope of this article.
However, for more information see Flauren F. Bender, “I’m Sorry” Laws and Medical Liability, 9
VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 300 (2007); Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and
Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000);
Ashley A. Davenport, Forgive and Forget: Recognition of Error and Use of Apology as Preemptive
Steps to ADR or Litigation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 81 (2006);
Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical
Errors, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1001 (2003); Rae M. Lamb, Open Disclosure: The Only Approach
to Medical Error, 13 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE 3 (2004), available at http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1758054/pdf/v013p00003.pdf; Mazor et al., Disclosure of
Medical Errors: What Factors Influence How Patients Respond?, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 704
(2006); Mazor et al., Health Plan Members’ Views about Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409 (2004); Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLIN.
ORTHOP. RELAT. RES. 376 (2009); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t About the
Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. L. REV. 1009 (2005); Lee Taft,
Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANN. HEALTH L. 55 (2005); Peter Geier,
Emerging Med-Mal Strategy: “I’m Sorry,” NAT’L L. J., Jul. 24, 2006, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1153472732197; Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doctors Learn to Say
“I’m Sorry”: Patients’ Stories of Hospital Errors Serve to Teach Staff, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007,
at D5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116960074741385710.html; Kevin Sack, Doctors
Say “I’m Sorry” Before “See You in Court,” N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/us/18apology.html?pagewanted=all; Charlie Schmidt, “We’re
Sorry”: The Healing Power of Apology—And How Two Little Words Can Make Medicine Safer,
HARV. PUB. HEALTH REV., Fall 2007, at 8; Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Should You Apologize?, MEDICAL
ECONOMICS, Apr. 21, 2006, at 50, available at http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/
memag/content/printContentPopup.jsp?id=319420.
160. Nelson, III, et al. supra note 154, at 496 (citing HEALTHCARE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra
note 155; Gostin, supra note 155, at 1742).
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judge-directed negotiation program will be established to achieve early
settlement.161 Early settlement will be achieved through disclosure,
communication, and a judge’s involvement earlier on in a case.162 Through
early settlement, health care providers will be able to receive feedback from
judges early on in a lawsuit.163 From this feedback, health care providers
can make necessary changes, which can ultimately improve patient safety.164
VI. THE VERDICT IS IN FOR JUDGE-DIRECTED NEGOTIATIONS
Despite the criticisms against judge-directed negotiations, judgedirected negotiations appear to provide a promising method for addressing
medical-malpractice litigation and could “serve as a model for other types of
tort cases as well.”165 The Obama administration certainly recognizes the
positive impact judge-directed negotiations has had on our nation’s health
care system given that it praises judge-directed negotiations for offering a
way for states “to curb liability expenses that have sharply increased health
care costs nationally.”166 Although there is no data for the expanded judgedirected negotiation program because at the time this article was written, the
three-year Harvard study was still being conducted,167 the numbers regarding
New York’s program show promising results.168 In fact, the federal Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which funds the New York
judge-directed negotiation program, estimates that the program could save
more than $1 billion annually throughout the nation.169 Moreover, Dr. James
B. Battles, the official overseeing the grant at the AHRQ, “hope[s] that other
states across the country [will] look at [the New York program] as a model
they might want to replicate.”170 Granted, each state has different medical
malpractice insurance systems and tort reform, and New York’s success

161. See New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, supra note 40.
162. Scott, supra note 1 (quoting HHC President Al Aviles: “If you are very transparent and
skilled in communication, you lower the sense of rage . . . and make settling cases easier.”).
163. See New York State to Conduct Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, supra note 40.
164. Id.
165. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
166. Glaberson, supra note 58.
167. Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note 33, at
108.
168. See Sataline, supra note 57
169. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
170. Glaberson, supra note 58.
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might not directly translate to other states. However, if a state like New
York, whose health care providers have among the highest malpractice
insurance rates in the country,171 can have such positive results, it seems that
judge-directed negotiations can become a national model for other states to
follow.172 Moreover, the judge-directed negotiation program works within
our current court systems such that laws do not need to be changed if states
adopt a judge-directed negotiation program.173
The problem, however, arises with funding.174 States that adopt a judgedirected negotiation program will have to find the finances to train judges
and hire medical assistants to help the judge.175 However, in the long run,
judge-directed negotiations save money by settling a case after only several
months rather than after several years.176 Moreover, not all areas of a state
may need to find funding to support a judge-directed negotiation program
because certain areas of a state may not have the same problem with
malpractice costs.177 For example, judge-directed negotiations might work
better in an urban setting that gives rise to high malpractice rates rather than
a rural area in which local hospitals have low malpractice rates.178
Furthermore, even if every state adopted a judge-directed negotiation
program, this will not solve all the problems that arise from medical
malpractice litigation.179 Rather, judge-directed negotiations can be one of

171. Just What the Doctor Ordered?, supra note 31.
172. See Gallegos, supra note 32.
173. Id. (quoting James Battles, PhD, a senior service fellow for patient safety and medical
errors at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: “There are no laws that need to be
changed. All the mechanics are in place.”). In contrast, health courts, in which specialized judges
review and rule on medical liability cases, require changing existing laws. Id.
174. See Gallegos, supra note 32.
175. Id. (quoting Michelle Mello: “Other states would need money to train judges and hire a
medical assistant, such as the nurse/attorney being used by New York judges. Another challenge
would be to find the right team and funding to evaluate their program.”).
176. See Health Care Appropriation Provides A Court-Based ADR Pilot Program, supra note
33, at 108.
177. See Virtanen, supra note 75 (quoting New York Chief Administrative Judge Ann Pfau: “It
makes sense for the pilot program to target high-population areas with a large number of cases and
high hospital malpractice costs,” and Justice McKeon: “What you’re finding is in poorer
communities you’re getting higher incidence of this and in poorer communities you’re finding the
huge verdicts.”).
178. See Telephone Interview with Judge Douglas McKeon, supra note 79.
179. Gallegos, supra note 32 (quoting Morris M. Auster, staff counsel for the Medical Society
of the State of New York: “We’re very hopeful that if this is very successful in reducing liability
costs, it could be expanded further . . . . but it’s not the be-all, end-all to address medical malpractice
insurance [rates].”). For example, New York physicians will not get significant relief from
insurance premiums and claims severity until the state enacts a noneconomic damages cap. Id.
(quoting Donald J. Fager, vice president of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company, the largest
writer of medical liability insurance in New York).
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many possible solutions.180 Although a judge-directed negotiation program
may not be adopted by all other states, it certainly has opened up the
discussion for alternative forms of handling medical malpractice liability
cases.

180. Gallegos, supra note 32 (quoting Morris M. Auster: “[Judge-directed negotiations are] one
of a series of solutions.”).
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